This volume offers a collection of in-depth explorations of pragmatism as a framework for discussions in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Each chapter involves explicit reflection on what it means to be pragmatist, and how to use pragmatism as a guiding framework in addressing topics such as realism, unification, fundamentality, truth, laws, reduction, and more. -/- .

In this phenomenological approach to meaning, the author defines his task as one of taking account of the kinds of relations the logical order can have to the preconceptual order. This preconceptual order is represented by a pre-logical activity which is called "experiencing." There is experiencing of meaning as well as of things. This "experienced or felt meaning" is said to be as important a dimension of meaning as the traditional modes distinguished by philosophers, e.g., denotation, connotation. Apparent throughout is (...) the author's concern as a psychotherapist to find theoretical foundations for clinical methods.--R. H. K. (shrink)

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to substantially (...) change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The essays in philosophical logic collected in this volume are dedicated to Henry S. Leonard who was one of the first American philosophers to urge the application of modern logic to non-mathematical areas. Leonard also inspired the development of certain areas of contemporary philosophical logic discussed in some of the papers of this volume. This is especially clear in the case of free, or presupposition free, logics which Leonard's early work on a logic of existence inspired. In one essay of (...) this volume Bas C. Van Frassen further develops his work on the semantics of free logic. In another, Milton Fisk relates free logic to modal logic, suggesting a new semantics of strength to deal with various problems in the area and in a third essay, Karel Lambert relates free logic to certain logical puzzles about quantum theory. Leonard was also one of the first to entertain the idea of and discuss a logic of questions and an erotetic logic or logic of interests. The volume contains essays on these topics by Nuel D. Belnap and David Harrah. Leonard's interest in modal logic is reflected in Fisk's article as well as in an article by Richmond Thomason on modal logic and metaphysics. His interest in epistemic logic is seen in an essay on the logic of belief by Jon Vickers and an essay by Hintikka applying the logic of belief and knowledge to problems about the ontological argument. In addition to these essays, there are five others of high quality on diverse topics: R. M. Martin on intentions, Wilfrid Sellars on the metaphysics of the person, R. M. Chisholm on agency, Frederick Fitch on combinatory logic and negative numbers, and H. E. Hendry and G. J. Massey on Sheffer functions. This is a worthy memorial to a quietly influential American philosopher.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is a translation of Jacob Klein's study "Die Griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra" which appeared in 1934-1936. His principal thesis is that the Renaissance mathematicians of the sixteenth century did not simply continue the work of the Greek and Arab mathematicians but in the process of developing ancient mathematics introduced a radically new conception of number which has since guided modern mathematical thought. The central figure in this revolution is Vieta. Klein traces the influence of Vieta's ideas (...) upon Stevin, Descartes, Wallis, and other figures of the scientific revolution, after discussing the conception of number and arithmetic in Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek sources. Persons reading this book with a primary interest in the philosophical ideas involved will be frustrated by the mass of historical detail which often obscures rather than illuminates the philosophical issues. But the book deserves its reputation as an important historical study.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this British Academy lecture, Popper argues for a reformulation of epistemological questions. In the past we have asked for the ultimate sources of knowledge and thus begged for authoritarian answers. He charges that this question of origins is relevant to the determination of meaning but not to the determination of truth. The historical sections are often interesting in their own right, especially those on the conspiracy theory of ignorance.--R. H. K.

This anthology collects readings from important nineteenth and early twentieth century figures who contributed to the philosophy of science before that discipline emerged in the last 40 years as an area of study in its own right. It begins with a seldom-read selection by Kant ) and ends with a selection from Bridgman's The Logic of Modern Physics. Each selection is preceded by a three-page biography of the author together with a bibliography of his major writings and some writings on (...) his work. Many familiar names appear, e.g., Mill, Mach, Pearson, Hertz, Poincare, Peirce, Duhem, Russell, Whitehead, and Campbell. But there are others represented whose actual writings are not so familiar to many students of the philosophy of science, e.g., J. F. W. Herschel, William Whewell, Hermann Von Helmholtz, J. B. Stallo, Emile Boutroux and William Ostwald. With the exception of Stallo, the writings of these figures have been long out of print. In one case, a selection from Ludwig Boltzmann on the nature of mechanics, the editor has translated the selected passage into English expressly for this volume. A wide range of topics are considered in the readings: physical laws, theories, induction, observation, space, time, and others; but, as the nature of the case requires, the focus of attention is on classical science. For this reason most existing courses in the philosophy of science could use this collection only as a supplementary text. But it would function well in such a role. Moreover, specialized courses in the history of philosophical thinking about science will find it very useful.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to introduce the reader to some new areas of contemporary logic which generally fall under the rubric of philosophical logic. It succeeds in this task to a degree, although the chapters are for the most part adaptations of journal articles published by Rescher over the last ten years and are more self-contained than they might have been. But the book should renew interest in the problems of philosophical logic. It contains many interesting discussions and (...) a great deal of useful information. Rescher begins with chapters on modal logic which include some discussion of intuitionistic logic and the causal modalities as well as the alethic modalities. He then discusses the notion of belief as a representative notion of epistemic logic. A long chapter is devoted to a history and survey of the main systems of many valued logics. Shorter, but still substantial, chapters are devoted to the logic of existence, non-standard quantification theory, chronological or tense logic, topological or positional logic, logic of assertion and logic of preference. Still shorter chapters are given to deontic logic, probability logic, a discussion of random individuals and self-reference. An interesting final chapter provides a new "discourse on method" for the philosophical or applied logician.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this very brief space the author summarizes in the form of a succession of theses, all but the purely historical sections of Osnovy Marksistskoj Filosofii, the 1958 text of Soviet Marxist Philosophy published by the Institute of Philosophy and the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. For specialists, this synopsis cannot replace the original text, as yet untranslated into English, but it will provide for the general reader an excellent summary of what is currently, in the author's words, (...) "the heart of Soviet dogma." Philosophically significant theses are given in direct translation. The only complaint would be that the price of this slim volume is rather high.—R. H. K. (shrink)

In spite of the title, the author of this book asserts that its primary aim is to offer a reasonable account of the concepts of possibility and potentiality. His analysis of these concepts allows him to approach the free will controversy in his own way and to offer many interesting analyses and arguments bearing on the issue. He distinguishes three kinds of non-logical possibility: epistemic or relative possibility, natural possibility or natural power, and possibility of choice or personal power. He (...) thinks that the arguments for determinism have been based in one way or another on a failure to notice the subtle differences which exist between these three kinds of non-logical possibility. Although there is room for doubt that his analysis adds up to a decisive refutation of determinism, he has found many interesting differences between kinds of possibility and potentiality which bear on the free will issue and other philosophical issues as well. There is a discernible influence of Ryle and Austin on the book although both of these philosophers come in for criticism, especially Ryle for his failure to carefully separate the different meanings of 'power', 'tendency', 'capacity', and similar terms, and for his general commitment to the notion that all power is conditional. This latter thesis is one of the author's main targets.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This fifth volume in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science is devoted primarily to the natural sciences, but like previous volumes in this series there is considerable variety in the topics discussed and the approaches taken by different contributors differ markedly. The first contribution is a 150 page essay by A. Grünbaum which is a reply to Hilary Putnam's critique of Grünbaum's philosophy of geometry. The essays by Peter Havas on causality and relativity and by Carl F. von (...) Weizäcker on the unity of physics are essays on the foundations of physical science by physicists who have distinguished themselves in this area. Helpful comments are added to the Havas' paper by John Stachel and to the von Weizäcker paper by Francis Zucker. Zucker provides a useful introduction to von Weizäcker's ambitious project of unifying physics for reader's unfamiliar with von Weizäcker's work. A symposium on theoretical entities and functional explanation in biology is included, with a paper by June Goodfield and comments by Ernst Mayr and Joseph Agassi. Historical essays include a discussion of hypotheses in Newton's philosophy and the development of the cognitive faculties in the theories of Ernst Mach. In addition, there are essays on logic in relation to physical science, measurement, models, symmetry, proof, truth, and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Papers collected in this volume were originally presented at a symposium held at the University of Pennsylvania in December, 1968 and revised in the light of discussion at the symposium for publication. The contributors hold different views about the role played by induction in theories of knowledge and rational belief but many of the papers are conciliatory, reflecting no doubt a good deal of helpful communication at the symposium. For example, Frederic Schick's clearly written and informative lead article considers subjectivist, (...) empiricist, and pragmatist theories of rational belief, arguing that they are compatible theories relevant to different types of issues. Marshall Swain follows with an article which presents a general framework within which rules of rational acceptance can be constructed. An exchange between Isaac Levi and Richard Jeffrey shows that advocates of theories of acceptance and theories of partial belief may be defending complementary and not mutually exclusive theories. In the remaining three essays Henry Kyburg Jr., Gilbert Harman, and Keith Lehrer defend their own distinctive views about the nature of inductive inference and rational belief. Kyburg traces difficulties in some theories to the acceptance of the principle of conjunction which he rejects. Harman and Lehrer both see the relation of inductive inference to explanation as crucial to understanding the former and they develop theories along different lines which make use of this relation. A long and useful bibliography was prepared for the symposium by Ralph L. Slaght and revised for publication in the volume.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The translator has collected passages from the varied corpus of Schweitzer's writing and has pieced them together into a brief but impressive sketch of the man and the thinker. Some sections are autobiographical; others contain Schweitzer's thoughts on Africa, world peace, on Goethe and Bach among historical figures, and a few of his basic philosophical ideas. An index provides references to the original works.--R. H. K.

In the introduction to this bibliography of works in the philosophy of science, the author stresses that it provides only the éléments of a bibliography and does not claim to be complete. His aim is to provide a starting point around which interested parties can build their own bibliographies. Although it may be of some use in this regard, philosophers of science in the English-speaking world will not find the volume of very much use for authors writing in English. Some (...) authors are not listed at all and others who do appear have only two or three listings. Examples could be multiplied, but these provide a representative picture of the volume's limitations in this regard. On the other hand, as a preliminary guide to books and articles in the philosophy of science by authors writing in different languages than one's own, the book can be of undoubted usefulness. Works in most of the languages of Western Europe are listed, the majority in French, German and Italian, as well as English.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Two fundamental theses of sensationalism as a theory of science, formulated by Mach and influential since his time, are critically treated in this analytic study. The first is that the basic elements of experience are sensations, the second that scientific explanation is no more than a complete description of phenomena in terms of sensations. In arguing against these claims the author touches on many important issues in the philosophy of science, including questions about the nature of description and explanation. He (...) argues against the view that there are no pure descriptions, in the sense of descriptions which are free of interpretation.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A highly technical theory of visual perception is developed in the first half of this psychological study with the aid of set-theoretical symbols and a complex array of variables ranging over states of the various sub-systems of the organism related to perception. In the later chapters the author describes several new and crucial experiments favoring the theory over other theories of perception, and discusses its philosophical implications for a behavioral account of mind. Those who wade through the welter of symbols (...) will find important material for a philosophy of perception in the theory and especially in the experiments, involving externally induced environmental changes which are corrected by the behavior of the organism over a period of time. --R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is a study of meaning and meaninglessness which takes as its point of departure a discussion of sentences like "The theory of relativity is blue" which some philosophers call category mistakes and which this author calls type crossings. His answer to the question of the basis of the meaninglessness of such sentences differs from most currently fashionable ones. For example, he argues in separate chapters against the view that the basis for the meaninglessness of sentences involving type crossings (...) is in the fact that they are ungrammatical. He also rejects the view that this basis is in the fact that the sentences violate certain rules of language His answer is that type crossings are meaningless because they designate unthinkable propositions. He then devotes two long and crucial chapters to an attempt to elaborate on the notion of unthinkability. His approach is more complicated than this brief summary would suggest for he distinguishes between accidental and essential properties and relations, requiring different criteria for type crossings involving accidental or essential attributes. Drange's views run against the grain of much contemporary philosophizing about meaning, e.g., his essentialism, his advocacy of a kind of synthetic a priori and his emphasis on thinkability over rules of language. But he comes to these positions by exposing what he takes to be difficulties in alternative views, so that his views are always challenging. Aside from its main theses, the book looks into topics about meaning and type crossings which other writers have scarcely noticed or discussed. For example, he tries to come to grips with the largely uncharted region of type crossings involving relational properties and those involving types other than types of things.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The debate between hard and soft determinists is dealt with in this brief but interesting study. The author argues that there is no empirical dispute between hard and soft determinists. They draw different conclusions from the observed facts and these differences are the result of using different senses of the terms 'freedom' and 'moral responsibility'. Moritz Schlick's Problems of Ethics is the author's favored source for the soft determinist position and well-known articles by Paul Edwards and John Hospers the sources (...) for hard determinism. Other writers are quoted and briefly discussed. The treatment of many criticisms and countercriticisms is all too brief to do full justice to all the issues involved, but those topics which the author discusses are often illuminated. Interesting things are said about such topics as kleptomania, post-hypnotic suggestion, punishment, and excusable behavior. The book makes a convincing case, at least for the claim that a sophisticated version of the hard determinist position, such as appears in Hospers article, is only verbally different than many versions of soft determinism. Other versions of hard and soft determinism can and do come in substantive conflict with one another.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis of the (...) indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)